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ABSTRACT 
Management of the business-government relationship is critical for firm performance in regulated industries. 
In this paper, we predict a U-shaped relationship between product complexity and the time to approval by the 
US Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Moreover, we argue that this association is contingent on the types 
of strategic alliances (i.e., R&D alliance, Marketing alliance) of the focal firm in that those alliances help FDA 
and pharmaceutical companies achieve harmony. Using the approved drugs by FDA from 1999 to 2016 as the 
sample, our hypotheses are supported by the empirical analysis on US pharmaceutical firms. The findings have 
important implications to achieving harmony between pharmaceutical firms and regulatory agencies.  
KEYWORDS 
Product Complexity, Regulatory Approval, Harmony 
INTRODUCTION 
The recent Coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic has brought light to some of the dilemmas in new drug 
development and approval. New drug introduction to the market poses a double-edged sword for 
governmental approval agencies such as the United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA). While 
governments certainly welcome the innovativeness and complexity of new drugs, they also desire to 
control the pace of approval to identify safety problems (Carpenter, 2014). Obviously, the government-
business relationship is very important for firm performance and firm survival. And it is especially 
salient in regulated industries (Desai, 2016). Previous research on such relationships has been largely 
focused on the effect of public policy on firm performance (Hiatt & Sine, 2014), the responses that 
firms make to regulatory change (e.g., Kozhikode, 2016), and regulators’ responses to firms’ behaviors 
(Heese, Krishnan, & Moers, 2015; Hiatt & Park, 2013). However, little is known about regulatory agency 
responses to i) characteristics of firms’ outcomes (e.g., how complexity of regulated products affects 
agency opinions), and ii) firms’ efforts to lower the information asymmetries between government 
agencies and businesses (e.g., how firms signal quality of regulated products through the reputation 
of their partners with whom they collaborate). Given the importance of product complexity in the 
approval process of FDA, the lack of research on how product complexity in product regulatory 
approval is certainly surprising. Our study fills this research gap by examining both the technical 




features of a product and market uncertainty that arises when firms launch these complex products. 
Overall, government agencies are very powerful in regulated industries such as the pharmaceutical 
industry. The FDA, for example, “sustains a battery of powers” (Carpenter, 2014, p.1) in testing, 
marketing, labeling, advertising, and manufacturing of prescription drugs. In comparison, 
corporations have more limited powers in highly regulated industries. One question that arises is 
whether corporations can leverage their resources to gain power in the drug approval process to 
receive more favorable outcomes. Our answer is yes, and we base this conclusion on the premise that 
regulatory decisions are not based simply on power, but are determined by “a networked congeries 
of audiences” such as consumers, media organizations, science and business communities, and 
political forces (Carpenter, 2014, p10). Although there has been research examining the influence of 
regulatory agencies on firm outcomes (e.g., Kozhikode, 2016), theoretical extensions have been 
lacking. In this research, we argue that companies may leverage partnerships to expedite the approval 
process for complex drugs. The authorization of an emergency use for the antiviral drug, Remdesivir, 
is an example (FDA, 2020). In this paper, we argue that to promote social utility, government agencies, 
as governing bodies, take on the responsibilities to protect the interests of principals (i.e., citizens) to 
ensure an approved new drug “is almost certainly both safe and effective” (Carpenter, 2014, p.2). We 
argue that product complexity and strategic alliances may align the interests of the government 
agencies and the corporations, thus influencing the drug approval process.        
By conducting this research, we make the following contributions. First, we examine the effect of 
product complexity on new drug approval, which impacts not only many people’s lives but also the 
financial performance of producing companies (Galambos & Sturchio, 1998). By examining the specific 
contexts firms face when submitting drugs for regulatory approval, this study sheds light on how 
social forces and product complexity are intertwined in the regulatory process. Second, the findings 
of this study inform researchers about how the drug approval process is affected by product 
complexity. Our research is among the first studies to address how firms’ partnerships alert 
stakeholders to the qualities of complex products, and how product complexity impacts marketing 
approval decisions by regulatory agencies. Third, from a methodological standpoint, we utilize a 
measure of product complexity not previously used in management research. Previous research on 
outcome complexity generally focuses on process complexity (Olausson & Berggren, 2010). Product 
complexity has been previously measured through consumer and manager perceptions (e.g., 
Swaminathan, 2003, Novak & Eppinger, 2001). However, no management scholar to our knowledge 
has objectively quantified product complexity. In the pharmaceutical industry, the chemical 
characteristics of new drugs are the primary information that FDA regulators consider in the approval 
process. Hence, we apply software used in chemical sciences to compute the molecular complexity of 
the drug molecule based on the bond connectivity and element diversity. In essence, this technical 
measure of product complexity provides a more objective way to capture the specific features of the 




PRODUCT COMPLEXITY AND STRATEGIC ALLIANCES 
 
Product complexity has been examined broadly across academic fields (e.g., Baldwin & Clark, 2000; 
Chan, 2000). The major findings are that product complexity not only increases the product 
enhancement effort (Banker et al., 1998) but also increases the interdependency among units within 
a firm (Baldwin & Clark, 2000; Winter & Szulanski, 2001). Specifically, high complexity demands 
frequent communication between different units within a firm to make innovative upgrades or 
modifications (Henderson & Clark, 1990). Furthermore, Henderson and Clark (1990) also argue that 




the organization teams should establish high understanding and interdependencies to develop more 
complex products. Time to transfer complex technology or information is also required (Salomon & 
Martin, 2003). Because of these elevated costs, firms may ignore customers desires for increasingly 
complex products and focus on only incrementally innovative products (Ethiraj et al., 2012). In addition, 
even within a firm, decision-makers can be reluctant to pursue complex projects since they often 
require aggregation of dispersed information and heightened coordination (Henderson & Clark, 1990). 
In the setting of government-business relationships such as FDA approval, the influence of product 
complexity may entail additional complexity since it often involves collaboration among multiple firms 
and public institutions.   
Strategic alliances formed during new drug development can provide information to the FDA about 
product quality that is otherwise unavailable, and, hence, collaboration often increases the likelihood 
of pharmaceutical regulatory approval (Carpenter, 2014). Firms not only obtain complementary 
resources from partners, but also achieve economies of scale/scope. The formation of alliances could 
help firms to exchange resources and assess their values (Diestre & Rajagopalan, 2012; Saxton, 1997). 
For instance, Li et al. (2008) find that partner selection acts as an important governance mechanism 
to protect the intellectual property in the alliance entity. Leiblein and Reuer (2004) find that strategic 
alliances can inhibit opportunistic behavior of the partners. These findings suggest that strategic 
alliances could improve company performance. Alliances, therefore, can signal high levels of potential 
product quality to regulatory agencies (Carpenter, 2014). Specifically, the characteristics of strategic 
alliances could have significant effects on firm outcomes (e.g., Gulati & Higgins, 2003), such as 
performance improvement (Sampson, 2007), knowledge acquirement (Novak & Eppinger, 2001), and 
lower market uncertainty (Baum, Calabrese, & Silverman, 2000; Diestre & Rajagopalan, 2012). In this 
paper, we argue that the effect of product complexity on time to approval is contingent on strategic 
alliances. 
 
THE CURVILINEAR EFFECT OF PRODUCT COMPLEXITY ON TIME TO APPROVAL 
 
Product complexity could signal heightened advancement potential for the technology embedded in 
the product. For drug companies, more complex drugs may experience quick approval from FDA, 
given that both parties (pharmaceutical companies and FDA) share the same object of pushing the 
effective drugs to the market as soon as possible.  And some studies in medicinal chemistry have linked 
molecular complexity to efficacy of drugs (e.g., Caille et al., 2019).  As drugs become more disease 
specific and safety requirements concomitantly increase, pharmaceutical development has 
necessitated more chemical complex compounds (Walters, Green, Weiss, & Murcko, 2011). Therefore, 
since speed to market of effective and safe treatments is one goal of the FDA, one would expect that 
increasing product complexity may shorten the time to approval from FDA. Greater complexity tends 
to suggest greater efficacy.  
However, when product complexity is high, higher information asymmetry and concerns from FDA 
may be elevated as well. Higher complexity creates greater difficulty in a regulatory agency’s 
understanding a drug’s mechanisms, its adverse effects, and its unintended consequences. While the 
producing firm may have detailed knowledge of the drug due to its experience with it in research and 
development, regulatory agencies must rely on secondhand reports and filings for this knowledge 
(e.g., Holmstrom, 1989). This asymmetry, in turn, may prolong the time required for a drug to receive 
regulatory approval. Indeed, increases in chemical complexity often result in greater dissimilarity 
between the focal and previous drugs, reducing regulators’ abilities to compare the focal drug with 
previously considered therapies (Walter et al., 2011). Novelty, in turn, leads to unforeseen obstacles, 
side-effects, and contingencies (e.g., Holmstrom, 1989), reducing likelihoods of approval.   




Further, highly complex products tend to be associated with technical uncertainty that may result 
in ambiguity for regulatory agencies. Since highly complex products may have little structural similarity 
to previous products, regulatory agencies will have relative few previous “models” on which to base 
their decision (Holmstrom, 1989). These factors will tend to slow the process of regulatory approval.  
Accordingly, we suggest that moderate levels of product complexity will lead to shortest approval 
times for new pharmaceuticals. Moderate complexity levels provide enough complexity to ensure 
novelty and chemical efficacy while mitigating against significant uncertainties that might cause delays 
in the FDA approval process. Consistently, when product complexity is relatively low, increasing 
product complexity may lead to shorter times to approval as efficacy rises with complexity. Rising 
complexity and attendant efficacy compel the FDA to speed regulatory approval. After a midpoint of 
complexity, however, increases in complexity reduce the FDA’s ability to process and understand 
information in a timely manner. Increases in complexity at relatively high levels, therefore, increase 
approval times. Hence, we expect that there is curvilinear relationship between product complexity 
and time to approval from FDA. 
 
Hypothesis 1: There is a U-shaped relationship between product complexity and time to approval 
such that time to approval decreases from low to moderate product complexity and increases from 
moderate to high product complexity. 
 




For a complex product to receive regulatory approval, the producing company needs to provide 
enough information so that the regulatory agency could evaluate the product in an objective and 
complete manner. However, due to the difficulty a firm may have in transferring knowledge of 
complex products to the regulatory agency (Kogut & Zander, 1993; Szulanski, 1996), the regulatory 
agency will require considerable time to assess the feasibility and safety. We argue that strategic 
alliances can aid firms in transferring information to regulatory agencies.   
An R&D alliance is one of the major vehicles that firms pursue to develop advanced technology for 
products or services, especially in the pharmaceutical industry (Hoang & Rothaermel, 2005; Oxley & 
Sampson, 2004; Sampson, 2007). R&D alliances could improve firms’ innovation performance 
significantly compared with firms without R&D alliances (Sampson, 2007).  
In the context of pharmaceutical industry, the involvement of an R&D partner when developing a 
complex product indicates that the focal firm has invested a significant amount of time and energy to 
produce the advanced technology (Hoang & Rothaermel, 2005). As noted, collaboration often 
increases the likelihood of pharmaceutical regulatory approval (Carpenter, 2014). Firms obtain 
complementary resources from partners and achieve economies of scale/scope. Strategic alliances can 
inhibit the opportunistic behavior of the partners (Leiblein & Reurer, 2004), further improving alliance 
performance. Hence, alliance can signal the reliability and feasibility of the technology thereby, 
reducing the agency’s concerns on safety and adverse selection problem.  
In sum, R&D alliances harmonize the joint effort by corporations and government agencies. R&D 
agreements may reduce the cost associated with the drug development process (Shan, Walker, & 
Kogut, 1994) and provide firms more access to financial resources (Gerlach, 1992). Further, R&D 
alliances give government agencies assurance that technical uncertainty may be mitigated due to the 
joint effort by several companies. Therefore, we predict that the time to get approved by regulatory 
agency will be shortened as the focal firm has more partners in R&D alliances for a certain level of 
product complexity. 




Hypothesis 2: The number of the focal firm’s partners in R&D alliance moderates the U-shaped 
relationship between product complexity and time to approval in such a way that as the number 




Marketing alliances are an important vehicle used to build customer awareness and complement the 
products from each partner (Anderson & Narus, 1990; Bucklin & Sengupta, 1993). Marketing alliances 
involve the partners’ collaboration in the marketplace for increasing market share of each other’s 
products (Bucklin & Sengupta, 1993). These alliances allow partners to contribute their unique 
resources and strengths to the partnership, in order to lower the market uncertainty associated with 
the new product. Each company shares knowledge it has developed so that the likelihood of success 
in launching the new product is higher (Baum, Calabrese, & Silverman, 2000; Diestre & Rajagopalan, 
2012). 
Marketing alliances could benefit the partner firms in at least two ways. First, partners can acquire 
from others new management and technological abilities (Dollinger, Golden, & Saxton, 1997), and 
access scarce resource (Wernerfelt, 1984). Second, forming a marketing alliance with reputable 
companies could lead to successful and innovative products since reputable partners provide a signal 
of quality for the focal firm (Granovetter, 1985; Hill, 1990; Saxton, 1997).  
In the context of pharmaceutical industry, the launch of a new drug is associated with the safety 
and efficacy of the drug. Strategic marketing alliances are critically important for the introduction of 
the new product, especially when there is technologically advanced knowledge represented in the 
new product (Bucklin & Sengupta, 1993). Regulatory agency may also use this signal as an indication 
of the quality of the drug seeking regulatory approval. To some extent, marketing alliances could 
signal the future market potential of the product once the product is launched. Therefore, we predict 
that the number of marketing alliances in which a firm is involved also indicates harmony between 
government agencies and the firm. Marketing alliances act as a signal to the regulatory agency, 
thereby shortening approval times at all levels of complexity. In short, the number of marketing 
alliances should moderate the relationship between product complexity and time to approval. 
  
Hypothesis 3: The number of the focal firm’s partners in marketing alliances moderates the U-
shaped relationship between product complexity and time to approval in such a way that as the 




Data on New Molecular Entity and New Biologic drugs (NMEs) approved by US Food and Drug 
Administration from 1999 to 2016 was collected. NMEs cover a significant amount of customer market 
in U.S. Although there are significant differences in the structure of NME drugs and biologic drugs, the 
measurement used in this study is easily applied to both categories of drugs. Our sample consists of 
482 FDA approved drugs in 18 years. 
The Medtrack database was used to obtain the firm and chemistry data that is associated with each 
drug. Medtrack has been used in research about pharmaceutical industry (Diestre & Rajagopalan, 2012; 
Diestre, Rajagopalan, & Dutta, 2015) to provide firm-level information such as firm size, age, 
performance, R&D alliances, marketing alliances, corporate venture activities, and patent portfolios 
of firms across 17 therapeutic markets. Medtrack provides the marketed drugs and newly developed 
drugs for each firm as well as the active ingredient involved in each drug. The database also contains 
information regarding development stages of each drug, such as Research, Preclinical, Phase I, Phase 




II, Phase III, Pending Approval, Approved, and Marketed. Each drug has a specific therapeutic domain 
based on its therapeutic properties and it contains a chemistry identifier.  
PubChem database, an open source database, was used to collect the chemical structure 
information of each drug. The PubChem is a chemistry database which indexes all disclosed molecules 
in chemistry fields and assigns a Chemical Abstracts Service (CAS) number to each drug. By using CAS 
as the identifier, the chemical structure of each drug in our sample was specified and codified in 
PubChem database. Then a structural and elemental code of the drug molecule was used to compute 
the drug’s complexity. Firm level data was collected from Compustat Industrial Annual database. 
482 FDA approved drugs in 18 years consist of our sample. There are missing values about the 
development history in Medtrack database, which reduced our sample size. Moreover, other missing 




Time to Approval was measured as the number of days between the start of Preclinical development 




Product Complexity is measured by the molecular complexity of each drug. Each drug’s molecular 
complexity is measured using PaDel-Descriptor. This open source software is a common tool in 
chemistry fields and has been used to compute molecule's various characteristics (Tripathi & Kumar, 
2013; Yap, 2011). The molecular complexity in PaDeL-Descriptor measures a molecule's fragment 
complexity including functional groups, bonds, and the diversity of chemistry elements. PaDel-
Descriptor uses the formula developed by Hendrickson et al. (1987) that has been considered as the 
primary measure of product complexity and can be applied to more different types of molecules than 
other methods. Complexity is calculated via the following functions: 
 
𝐶𝐶 = 𝐶𝐶𝜂𝜂 + 𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸                                                                        (1) 
𝐶𝐶𝜂𝜂 = 2𝜂𝜂 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝜂𝜂 − 𝛴𝛴𝑖𝑖 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖                                                 (2) 
𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸 = 𝐸𝐸 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝐸𝐸 − 𝛴𝛴𝑗𝑗 𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗                                                  (3) 
 
The measure of molecular complexity (C) is a sum of two parts (equation 1): the first term 𝐶𝐶𝜂𝜂 
measures skeletal complexity as a function of bond connectivity (𝜂𝜂); the second term, 𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸, is a function 
of the diversity of elements, or atoms. Each of these terms also is composed of two parts: first 
(equation 2), an overall complexity term; and second (equation 3), a symmetry term subtracted from 
it to reduce the complexity to the extent that symmetry is present. This calculation integrates skeletal 
complexity as a function of bond connectivity and the diversity of elements. Therefore, our measure 
of molecular complexity is comprehensive and counts both structural diversity and the elemental 
diversity. PaDel-Descriptor uses the approach introduced by Hendrickson et al (1987) to compute the 
element complexity (Equation 3). Here, the work of Hendrickson et al (1987) is briefly introduced again 
to show the calculation of complexity, including the following equations and its derivatives. Although 
one can calculate molecular complexity based on three equations above, certain characteristics of 
atoms in molecule could be utilized to simplify the calculation such as Equation 2. In Equation 2, the 
computation of 𝜂𝜂 for the whole molecule could use the following equation: 
 




𝜂𝜂 = 1/2∑ (4 − ℎ𝑖𝑖)(3 − ℎ𝑖𝑖) −𝐷𝐷 − 3𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖                         (4) 
 
In Equation 4, ℎ is the number of hydrogens on each non-hydrogen atoms. 𝐷𝐷 is the number of 
double bonds. 𝑇𝑇 is the number of triple bonds. Due to the different types of bond connectivity, the 
second item in Equation 2 is more complicated, given that central atom could have different patterns 
of symmetry term 𝑆𝑆𝑘𝑘. Therefore, the second item in Equation 2 becomes the add-up of symmetry term 
𝑆𝑆𝑘𝑘 of all equivalent atoms that follow the same pattern of symmetry. Then Equation 2 is derived to the 
following equation: 
 
𝐶𝐶𝜂𝜂 = 2𝜂𝜂 lg 𝜂𝜂 −  ∑ (𝑆𝑆𝑘𝑘)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                                               (5) 
𝑘𝑘 = (3 − ℎ)(2− ℎ) + R                                             (6) 
 
k is the value of symmetry type; h is the number of hydrogen atom. Please refer to the work of 
Hendrickson et al (1987) for detailed information about the equations.  
For the purpose of demonstration, here we choose two drugs (Replax and Reyataz) as the 
examples to show the molecular complexity. Figure 1 shows the chemistry structures of Replax and 
Reyataz. As can be seen, Replax (complexity=346.9) is less complex than Reyataz 
(complexity=841.44). Our data indicates that Replax took around 4 years to get approved by FDA, 
while Reyataz took around 9 years to get approved. 
 
 
Figure 1. The Chemistry Structure of Replax and Reyataz 
 
R&D Alliance is measured as the total number of partners in R&D alliance that the firm has for 
developing one focal drug.  
Marketing Alliance is measured as the total number of partner companies that the focal company 










To mitigate confounding effect, various firm level variables were included in the analysis. Firm size 
was measured as the number of employees (Miller & Cardinal, 1994; Zhang et al., 2007), and was 
obtained from the Compustat database. Firm size is logarithmically transformed in the model. Past 
firm performance is measured as return on assets (ROA) in the previous year (Wowak et al., 2011). In 
pharmaceutical firms, research and development expense is very important for developing new drugs. 
High R&D expense could signal the technical reliability of the new drug. Therefore, R&D expense on 
drug developments was also controlled. Firm leverage to control for the firm’s tendency to use debt 
capital was also included as a control variable. This variable was measured as the ratio of total debt to 
total assets in order to control for the effect of firms' differences in capital on the choice of drug 
development (Geringer et al., 2000; Tallman & Li, 1996). To partial out the effects of 




The dependent variable is the number of days from the application of drug to the drug gets 
approved by FDA, which is a count variable and only takes non-negative integer values. Ordinary Least 
Square (OLS) regression assumes homoskedastic and normal distribution of error terms. The counted 
nature of our dependent variable violates those two assumptions. Therefore, negative binomial 
regression (which accounts for a Poisson distribution of our dependent variable) was used to estimate 
our empirical models (e.g., George, Wiklund, & Zahra, 2005; Sanders, 2001). In order to address 
potential multicollinearity problems, all the independent variables (except the year dummy variables) 
are standardized before entering the empirical analysis. All the values of the variance inflation factor 
(VIF) are lower than 4.95 in all the models, below the threshold value of 10 (Neter et al., 1985). So, 




Descriptive statistics, including means, standard deviations, and correlations are provided in Table 
1. The average time to get approved by FDA is 1,014 days (3 years), which is consistent with the previous 
findings (Choi & Contractor, 2016; Munos, 2009; Scillittoe et al., 2015). Firm leverage is negatively 
correlated with the time to get approved (-0.11, p < 0.05). R&D alliance is also negatively correlated 



















Table 1. Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix 
Variable Mean 
Std 
Dev 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Time to 
Approval 
(hundred) 
10.14 10.25        




3.92 2.86 -0.06 0.68***      
4. Firm 
Leverage 0.12 0.11 -0.11* -0.20*** -0.10+     
5. Firm 




0.34 1.12 0.08 -0.01 -0.08 -0.13 0.05   
7. R&D 
Alliance 2.24 1.72 -0.12* -0.25*** 0.05 0.05 -0.26*** -0.04  
8. Marketing 
Alliance 4.16 5.16 -0.07 -0.01 0.03 0.02 0.09 0.14* 0.31*** 
N=344 
a Logarithmically transformed 
+ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
 
Table 2 presents the regression results of testing our hypotheses. Model 1 includes control 
variables, Model 2 includes controls and the main effect of product complexity, and Model 3 includes 
controls, main effects, and the moderating effects of R&D alliance. Model 6 includes controls, main 
effects, and the moderating effects of Marketing Alliance. The results of Model 1 show that R&D 
expense (-0.593, p < 0.01) and firm leverage (-0.234, p < 0.01) significantly decrease the time to 
approval. However, firm size increases the time to approval (0.781, p < 0.001), indicating that bigger 


















Table 2. The Effect of Product Complexity on Time to Approval 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Firm Size 0.781*** (0.196) 0.784*** (0.194) 0.789*** (0.195) 
R&D Expense -0.593** (0.194) -0.635** (0.193) -0.692*** (0.190) 
Firm Leverage -0.234** (0.090) -0.260** (0.089) -0.267** (0.091) 
Firm Performance -0.176* (0.079) -0.126 (0.078) -0.116 (0.077) 
R&D Alliance 0.082 (0.071) 0.108 (0.073) 0.292* (0.133) 
Marketing Alliance       
Product Complexity 0.277** (0.097) -0.409 (0.296) -0.195 (0.303) 
Product 
Complexity_Squared   0.092* (0.042) 0.020 (0.040) 
Product Complexity X 




    -0.212** (0.069) 
Product Complexity X 




      
Constant 8.756*** (0.382) 8.5588*** (0.393) 8.552*** (0.386) 
Oberservations 344  344  344  
Log Pseudolikelihood -2889.9  -2887.9  -2882.1  
Wald Chi-squared 262.4***  311.2***  316.4***  
 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Firm Size 0.763*** (0.199) 0.766*** (0.198) 0.813*** (0.197) 
R&D Expense -0.576** (0.196) -0.616** (0.195) -0.715*** (0.196) 
Firm Leverage -0.239** (0.089) -0.267** (0.090) -0.287** (0.087) 
Firm Performance -0.201** (0.076) -0.162* (0.075) -0.136+ (0.072) 
R&D Alliance       
Marketing Alliance 0.049 (0.064) 0.076 (0.065) 0.173* (0.068) 
Product Complexity 0.266** (0.097) -0.426 (0.301) -0.823* (0.420) 
Product 
Complexity_Squared   0.092* (0.042) 0.148** (0.053) 
Product Complexity X 




      
Product Complexity X 




    -0.088** (0.029) 
Constant 8.751*** (0.383) 8.553*** (0.395) 8.364*** (0.416) 
Oberservations 344  344  344  
Log Pseudolikelihood -2890.1  -2888.2  -2883.4  
Wald Chi-squared 245.6***  280.1***  294.6***  
N=344. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Year dummies are not reported here for brevity.  
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Two-tailed tests. 
 




Hypothesis 1 predicted that a curved relationship between product complexity and the time to get 
approved. The results of Model 2 and Model 5 in Table 2 show that the beta coefficient of the squared 
term of product complexity is significantly related to the approval time (β = 0.092, p < 0.05; β = 0.092, 
p < 0.05). Therefore, Hypothesis 1 is supported. Model 5 confirms this supporting. Figure 2 depicts the 
relationship between product complexity and time to approval. The values of product complexity are 
taken as the percentiles in the sample. As product complexity increases, time to approval is shortened. 
However, higher product complexity leads to longer time to approval as product complexity is high, 
which confirms the curve-shaped relationship.  
Hypothesis 2 proposed that the relationship between product complexity and approval time will 
be moderated as the number of a firm’s partners in R&D alliance increases in such a way that time to 
approval is shortened for either low complex or high complex products. The results of Model 3 in Table 
2 indicate that R&D alliance has a negative moderating effect on the relationship between time to 
approval and the squared term of product complexity (β = -0.212, p < 0.01). Figure 3 is generated to 
present this negative moderating effect. The values of R&D alliance are taken as one standard 
deviation below and above the mean value. The values of product complexity are taken as the 
percentiles in the sample. As shown, as the number of partners in R&D alliance increases, approval 
time is shortened for either low product complexity or high product complexity. Therefore, Hypothesis 
2 is supported. The post estimation analysis indicates that time to approval decreases 317 days when 
increasing forming one more partner in R&D alliance at the average level of product complexity. 
 
 











Figure 3. The Moderating Effect of R&D Alliance on the Relationship between Product Complexity 
and Time to Approval 
 
Hypothesis 3 states that a firm’s marketing alliances moderate the U-shaped relationship between 
product complexity and time to approval in such a way that as the number of the focal firm’s partners 
in marketing alliances increases, time to approval is shortened for either low complex or high complex 
products. The results of Model 6 in Table 2 show that marketing alliances significantly moderate the 
effect of product complexity squared (β = -0.088, p < 0.01). Figure 4 also shows the significant 
moderating effect of marketing alliances. It shows that as the number of partners in marketing 
alliances increases, the approval time is shortened. Therefore, Hypothesis 3 is supported. The post 
estimation analysis indicates that time to approval decreases 90 days when there is one more partner 
in marketing alliance at the average level of product complexity. 
 





Figure 4. The Moderating Effect of Marketing Alliance on the Relationship between Product 
Complexity and Time to Approval 
 
Since our interest in this research is about the relationship between product complexity and time 
to approval, only approved drugs are included in the sample. On one hand, this sampling to some 
extent matches our research questions and theoretical development. However, it may potentially 
introduce selection bias problem. Therefore, to address this problem, a Heckman Selection analysis 
was conducted by using the sample of 344 approved drugs and 160 failed drugs. A Probit regression 
was performed in the first stage. In the first stage, a binary variable created to indicate whether the 
drug was approved by the FDA or failed in clinical trials.  This dichotomous variable was then regressed 
on firm size, R&D expense, molecular complexity, the number of indications, and the pharmaceutical 
class of the drug. An inverse Mills ratio generated from the first stage and controlling for the degree 
to which selection bias affects contaminates our estimations was added into the models in the second 
stage for predicting the time to approval. The results of the Heckman selection analysis are very 




Our study extends the research about government-business relationships from the responses of the 
company to regulatory agencies. We argue that companies need to address technical uncertainty and 
market uncertainty associated with complex products in order to get products approved. The 
formation of strategic alliances, such as R&D alliance and marketing alliance could address this 
problem. By taking a sample of drug molecules from U.S. pharmaceutical companies, we find that 
there is a U-shaped relationship between product complexity and time to approval by FDA. This finding 
indicates that it takes shorter time for FDA to approve a new drug with increasing product complexity 
when product complexity is low. However, when product complexity is high, the FDA may require 




more evidence to lower the technical uncertainty, increasing the time needed to reach the harmony 
between corporations and regulatory agency. As predicted, we find a negative moderating effect of 
R&D alliance and marketing alliance on the relationship between product complexity and time to 
approval, indicating that those two types of strategic alliances could lower the technical uncertainty 
and market uncertainty surrounding a new drug. 
Our findings have important theoretical and practical implications. First, we extend the research on 
government-business relationships to the government side by considering product complexity and 
regulatory approval. The seminal work of Simonin (1999) tested the relationship between complexity 
and ambiguity in strategic alliances. As far as we know, no other research tests the characteristics of 
organizational output on the response from the regulatory agency. Our findings demonstrate that 
product complexity does have significant influences on the decision making of regulatory agencies. 
Second, our findings indicate that regulatory agencies are concerned about technical uncertainty. The 
characteristics of the focal firm shifts the concerns in different ways. Third, our study demonstrates 
the contingency effect of R&D alliance partners and marketing alliance partners in the regulatory 
approval process. Therefore, the relationship between product complexity and the time to approval 
is contextually dependent. 
Although our theoretical predictions and empirical findings indicate that firms form strategic 
alliances to signal the high safety and market potential for the new drugs, focal firms are not 
necessarily expected to game the system. Previous research about “cheap talk” (Crawford & Sobel, 
1982) and lying (e.g., Gneezy, Kajackaite, & Sobel, 2018) shows that it is unlikely for focal firms to form 
strategic alliances with an intention of misrepresentation or absent efficacy. Purposeful lying won’t 
occur when there are significant costs associated with lying, such as tarnished reputation, damaged 
public image concern etc. (e.g., Abeler, Becker, & Falk, 2014; Dreber & Johannesson, 2008; Mazar, 
Amir, & Ariely, 2008). Gneezy, Kajackaite, and Sobel (2018) found that there are intrinsic costs 
associated with lying, depending on the magnitude of the lie. In new drug approval, focal firms usually 
make public announcement about strategic alliance partners. The public announcements would incur 
significant responses from shareholders and other important stakeholders (including judicial 
authorities) if these were misrepresentations. Moreover, the FDA review process could also guarantee 
the reliability of the new drugs, further decreasing the possibility of “cheap talk.” Therefore, even 
though there is a possibility that the focal firm may send false signals (e.g., by lying about strategic 
alliance formation), the scrutiny by the public and the FDA will most likely alert stakeholders to these 
transgressions. 
Our study is not without limitations which may offer the directions for future research. First, 
product complexity may have different effects on firm performance over time. For instance, complex 
products may take longer for the market to accept, leading to lower sales than less complex products 
at the initial stage of launch. However, at later stages, complex products may have more sales than 
less complex products due to the advantage in technology and safety. Therefore, future research 
could investigate how product complexity influences sales over time. Second, product similarity is 
another feature of the drug molecule which may interact with product complexity in affecting the 
decision of regulatory agency. Some products may be complex but similar to the products in other 
companies. Future research should address the effects product similarity has on regulatory approval. 
Third, due to the difficulty and availability of the data collection, FDA membership and philosophy was 
not well controlled in our empirical model. Future research may investigate the contingent factors 











By taking a sample of drug molecules from pharmaceutical companies, we tested the association 
between product complexity and the time to approval by FDA. We find that there is a U-shaped 
relationship between product complexity and time to approval by FDA. We also find that the 
relationship between product complexity and the time to approval depends on the strategic alliances 
the focal firms have. We believe this study will provide new avenues for research in product complexity 
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